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INTRODUCTION 
Down but not out, Lawrence Lessig has not rested since his 
defeat in Eldred v. Ashcroft1 on January 15, 2003.  In Eldred, the 
Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act (“CTEA”),2 enacted October 27, 1998, is 
constitutional as applied to existing works.3  Despite this setback, 
Lessig has continued to wage war against the provisions of the 
CTEA.  His ongoing efforts include developing the Creative 
Commons, an organization that simplifies copyright 
relinquishment;4 promoting the “Public Domain Enhancement 
Act,”5 a new bill to re-institute copyright renewal; and litigating 
two new cases, Golan v. Ashcroft6 and Kahle v. Ashcroft,7 where 
he challenges the constitutionality of the effects of the CTEA.8 
This Note evaluates the policies and legal arguments of the two 
new cases.  After a brief discussion of the legal arguments, it 
concludes that they are rather feeble and were properly dismissed 
on summary judgment.9  But this is not the Note’s focus, because it 
is not Lessig’s focus either.  Instead, it concentrates on what really 
interests Lessig: the policy questions he raises in his complaints.  
 
 1 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 2 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 105, 
108, 203, 301–04).  For more information on the CTEA, see infra Part I.A. 
 3 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198. 
 4 See, e.g., Jason Krause, The Education of Larry Lessig, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2004, at 38. 
 5 Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003); see LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 248–49 (2004). 
 6 See Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004); First Amended 
Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No. 01-B-1854). 
 7 See Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1127, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 
2004); Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Kahle v. Ashcroft (C 04-1127 
BZ), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml (last visited Mar. 
27, 2005). 
 8 See Krause, supra note 4, at 40–41. 
 9 See Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1218; Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at **8, 18. 
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The Note inquires: Would Lessig succeed if the plaintiffs’ lawsuits 
were based directly on their policy grievances, as opposed to 
constitutionality arguments divorced from them?10  In particular, 
this Note evaluates two claims directly encompassing Lessig’s 
policy concerns, arguments that the effect of the CTEA is 
unconstitutional because (i) the extended copyright terms are 
overly burdensome on those who publish public domain works11 
and (ii) the absence of renewal provisions results in works being 
locked-up, regardless of the preferences of the copyright holders.12 
Part I first recounts Congress’ stated rationale for the CTEA 
and the Supreme Court’s explanations for upholding it in Eldred.  
Next, it delineates some of the main arguments in support of 
petitioners that failed to persuade the Court in Eldred.  It will be 
useful to consider what arguments have already failed when 
evaluating the new arguments.  Finally, Part I introduces the 
plaintiffs of Golan and Kahle, and details their legal and policy 
arguments.  The legal arguments are quickly dismissed.  Parts II 
and III explore factual, legal, and policy considerations in favor of, 
and in conflict with, each of the claims proposed above, 
respectively.  Part IV provides a few additional considerations 
about the burden imposed by Eldred on future challenges of 
copyright terms.  The Note concludes that neither of the new 
arguments will succeed. 
The fairness claim that the CTEA is overly burdensome on 
public domain publishers and that these publishers should not 
suffer in order to give copyright holders a windfall will not be 
effective because (i) takings law does not recognize the public 
domain publishers’ injuries, (ii) there is insufficient reason to 
 
 10 This inquiry is worth making because in the wake of Eldred, a straight-forward 
challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA will not persuade courts.  In contrast, the 
plaintiffs’ grievances are more compelling.  A legal analysis of them is also useful 
because it serves as a springboard for evaluating closely what would result from granting 
the plaintiffs a remedy. See infra Parts I.E.1, I.F.1, respectively, for information about the 
Golan and Kahle plaintiffs. 
 11 See infra Part I.E.1.  The Golan plaintiffs are not just public domain publishers, but 
individuals who rely on the public domain publishing for their artistic endeavors.  
However the analysis is essentially the same; both are harmed from reliance upon shorter 
terms. 
 12 See infra Part I.F.2. 
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extend the application of takings law to compensate public domain 
publishers, and (iii) the Supreme Court clearly was aware of the 
consequences of the CTEA when it decided Eldred.13  There is also 
evidence that the Court implicitly indicated its position that the 
extension of copyright terms did not constitute a taking of the 
property of public domain publishers.14 
The proposed argument that works often get locked-up against 
the wishes of copyright holders is also not persuasive given the 
existence of various methods for copyright owners to renounce 
their copyright (including notifying the Copyright Office of their 
intent to abandon and participating in Lessig’s own Creative 
Commons) and the voluntary measures by which copyright holders 
can improve access to potential licensees (e.g., registration, update 
of registration, and the recordation of transfers).15 
I. THE CTEA: WHY CONGRESS ENACTED IT; WHY THE SUPREME 
COURT UPHELD IT; FAILED CHALLENGES; NEW CHALLENGES 
A. A Brief History of Pre-CTEA Copyright Term Lengths 
Under the Act of March 4, 1909 (“1909 Act”),16 the maximum 
term of protection was fifty-six years—an initial term of twenty-
eight years plus a renewal term of twenty-eight years.17  For works 
in statutory copyright prior to 1978, the Copyright Act of 1976 
(“1976 Act”)18 increased the renewal term to forty-seven years, for 
a total term of seventy-five years.19  It also changed the term of 
protection for works created in 1978 or later, based upon how the 
work was classified.  New works by a single author were accorded 
a single term of protection equal to the life of the author plus fifty 
 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 15 See infra Part III. 
 16 Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976) [hereinafter 1909 Act]. 
 17 See id. ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81; 3 NIMMER, MELVILLE B. & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.08 (2003). 
 18 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 [hereinafter 1976 Act]. 
 19 See id. § 304; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 9.08. 
STRATTON 5/25/2005  4:09 PM 
898 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 15:893 
years.20  Works made for hire and anonymous or pseudonymous 
works were granted a term of seventy-five years following 
publication, or one hundred years from creation, whichever expired 
first.21 
B. The CTEA 
The main effect22 of the CTEA is to extend the duration of 
copyright by twenty years.23  Copyright extension impacts nearly 
all works24 that have not entered the public domain before the end 
of 1997.25  As a result, with a very limited exception,26 no work 
will enter the public domain during the twenty-year period 
commencing on January 1, 1998,27 unless the copyright holder of a 
work elects to voluntarily renounce his copyright.28 
Congress asserted various rationales for the CTEA.29  First, in 
1993, the European Union issued a directive requiring member 
states to extend their copyright terms for the life of the author plus 
 
 20 See 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 
9.10[A][1]. 
 21 See 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(c); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 
9.10[B]. 
 22 For the complete provisions of the CTEA, see Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended 17 
U.S.C. §§ 105, 108, 203, 301–04).  In brief, the CTEA alters copyright term duration, the 
rules governing the termination of transfers, the rights of libraries and archives to 
reproduce works, and the voluntary negotiation of royalties for audiovisual works. 
 23 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04 (1998).  The twenty-year extension covers (1) works 
created after January 1, 1978 that are: (a) by a single author (§ 302(a)), (b) joint works (§ 
302(b)), or (c) anonymous, pseudonymous, or works made for hire (§ 302(c)); and (2) 
works created before 1978 that are: (a) not published or copyrighted before 1978, but 
published before December 31, 2002 (§ 303(a)), (b) still in their original copyright term 
on January 1, 1978 (§ 304(a)), or (c) in their renewal term on January 1, 1978 (§ 304(b)). 
 24 The exception is a narrow category of works, those that were created but not 
published or copyrighted by January 1, 1978, and thereafter not published by December 
31, 2002. See id. § 303(a); Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 379–80 (2000); supra note 23. 
 25 See Jaime Davids, Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court 
Decision, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 173, 174 (2003). 
 26 See supra note 24. 
 27 See Davids, supra note 25. 
 28 See infra Part III.A. 
 29 For a more thorough discussion of rationales in support of the CTEA, see Gifford, 
supra note 24, at 386–90. See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206–07 (2003). 
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seventy years, while directing them to grant non-member states 
only a term equal to their respective domestic copyright terms, if 
those are shorter than life plus seventy years.30  In response, 
Congress expressed the importance of harmonization with the 
EU,31 while emphasizing the significance of copyright to the 
American economy.32  Second, Congress noted that it is necessary 
to increase the copyright term to ensure the protection of the 
creator and at least one generation of heirs, in light of increasing 
life spans and parents having children later in life.33  Third, 
Congress observed that the creative incentives of authors and 
corporate copyright owners could be favorably enhanced by 
allowing them to take advantage of “‘technological developments 
[that] . . . have extended the commercial life of copyrighted 
works.’”34  Fourth, Congress realized that since copyright holders 
are often corporations rather than individual authors, “extended 
protection for existing works will provide added income with 
which to subsidize the creation of new works.”35  Finally, Congress 
 
 30 See Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9. 
 31 See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 7–9 (1996) (With the “increasingly global nature of the 
market for U.S. copyrighted works, . . . [u]niformity of copyright laws is enormously 
important to facilitate the free flow of copyrighted works between markets and to ensure 
the greatest possible exploitation of the commercial value of these works in world 
markets for the benefit of U.S. copyright owners and their dependents.”). 
 32 Id. (“America exports more copyrighted intellectual property than any country in the 
world, a huge percentage of it to nations of the European Union.  In fact, intellectual 
property is our second largest export with U.S. copyright industries accounting for 
roughly $40 billion in foreign sales in 1994. . . .  [C]ore copyright industries contribute 
more to the economy and employ more workers than any single manufacturing sector, 
accounting for more than 5 percent of the total U.S. workforce.”). 
 33 Id. at 10–11.  Moreover, Congress observes that “both the Berne Convention and the 
EU Directive have accepted the standard that copyright should protect the author and two 
succeeding generations,” and concludes that “the majority of American creators 
anticipate that their copyrights will serve as important sources of income for their 
children and through them into the succeeding generation.” Id. at 10. 
 34 Id. at 11–13.  More specifically, Congress asserts that “the likelihood that a work 
will remain highly profitable beyond the current term of copyright protection has 
increased significantly as the rate of technological advancement in communications and 
electronic media has continued to accelerate. . . . [T]he additional income [that 
technological advancement will produce] will increase existing incentives to create new 
and derivative works.” Id. at 12. 
 35 Id. at 12–13 (“[E]xtended protection for existing works will provide added income 
with which to subsidize the creation of new works.  This is particularly important in the 
case of corporate copyright owners, such as motion picture studios and publishers, who 
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recognized that extended copyrights would be a powerful and 
necessary incentive for private economic actors to preserve 
existing works in digital form.36 
Whether these ends are valid or constitutional, and whether the 
benefits outweigh the harms, are issues that have been hotly 
debated.37  These issues reached the Supreme Court in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft. 
C. The Eldred v. Ashcroft Decision 
Lawrence Lessig brought the Eldred case on behalf of 
publishers of works in the public domain.38  After losing at the 
District Court level39 and in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia,40 the Court of Appeals denied him rehearing en banc.41  
 
rely on the income from enduring works to finance the production of marginal works and 
those involving greater risks (i.e., works by young or emerging authors).”). 
 36 Id. at 13 (“Because digital formatting enables the creation of perfect reproductions at 
little or no cost, there is a tremendous disincentive to investing the huge sums of money 
necessary to transfer these works to a digital format, absent some assurance of an 
adequate return on that investment.  By extending the current copyright term for works 
that have not yet fallen into the public domain, including the term for works-made-for-
hire (e.g., motion pictures), the [CTEA] will create such an assurance by providing 
copyright owners at least 20 years to recoup their investment.”). 
 37 See, e.g., Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 
6 (Magazine), at 40; Davids, supra note 25; Gifford, supra note 24; infra Part I.D. 
 38 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003); see also Davids, supra note 25, at 183 
n.48 (“Petitioners are individuals and businesses that rely on the public domain for their 
creative work and livelihood.  Lead petitioner, Eric Eldred, is a noncommercial publisher 
of existing works and a creator of new derivative ones.  He founded Eldritch Press, an 
Internet based press that creates and stores copies of public domain works for the World 
Wide Web.  With [his] new technology[,] students and scholars are able to search the 
texts in ways that are not possible in the printed version.”). 
 39 Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting summary judgment for 
defendants), aff’d 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186 (2003).  Specifically, summary judgment was granted on plaintiff’s claims that 
“the CTEA violates the First Amendment,” “retrospective extension of copyright 
protection is beyond Congress’s enumerated power under the copyright clause,” and 
“retroactive extension of copyright protection violates the public trust doctrine.” Id. at 3–
4. 
 40 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J. dissenting in part).  Judge 
Sentelle argued in his dissent that the extension of existing copyrights was impermissible 
under the Copyright Clause. Id. at 380–84. 
 41 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (7-2 decision 
denying rehearing en banc). 
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Lessig then petitioned the Supreme Court for review.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two questions: 
“whether the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights exceeds 
Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause;42 and whether the 
CTEA’s extension of existing and future copyrights violates the 
First Amendment.”43 
The Supreme Court affirmed.44  In response to the first issue, 
the Court held that Congress has the authority to extend existing 
copyrights, even with the “limited Times” restriction.45  According 
to the Court, extending a “limited” term for an existing copyright 
does not necessarily alter its status as “limited.”46  Furthermore, 
“[h]istory reveals an unbroken congressional practice of granting 
to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term 
extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed 
evenhandedly under the same regime.”47 
 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science 
. . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Writings”). 
 43 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198. 
 44 Id. (7-2 decision) (Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 45 Id. at 199–204. 
 46 Id. at 199 (“Petitioners’ argument essentially reads into the text of the Copyright 
Clause the command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever ‘fixed’ or 
‘inalterable.’  The word ‘limited,’ however, does not convey a meaning so constricted.  
At the time of the Framing, that word meant what it means today: ‘confine[d] within 
certain bounds,’ ‘restrain[ed],’ or ‘circumscribe[d]. . . .’  Thus understood, a timespan 
appropriately ‘limited’ as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be 
‘limited’ when applied to existing copyrights.”). 
 47 Id. at 200.  “[T]he First Congress accorded the protections of the Nation’s first 
federal copyright statute to existing and future works alike. 1790 Act § 1.  Since then, 
Congress has regularly applied duration extensions to both existing and future copyrights. 
1831 Act §§ 1, 16; 1909 Act §§ 23–24; 1976 Act §§ 302–03; 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04.”  Id. 
at 200–01 (footnote omitted).  Moreover, “early Congresses extended the duration of 
numerous individual patents as well as copyrights” and “courts saw no ‘limited Times’ 
impediments to such extensions.” Id. at 201–02 (citations omitted).  “Congress’ 
consistent historical practice of applying newly enacted copyright terms to future and 
existing copyrights reflects a judgment stated concisely by Representative Huntington at 
the time of the 1831 Act: ‘[J]ustice, policy, and equity alike forb[id]’ that an ‘author who 
had sold his [work] a week ago, be placed in a worse situation than the author who should 
sell his work the day after the passing of [the] act.’” Id. at 204 (citations omitted). 
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Next, the Court examined whether the CTEA was a rational 
exercise of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause.48  The 
Court recounted Congress’ rationale for the CTEA,49 and in 
“substantial” “defer[ence]”50 to Congress, found that the CTEA 
was rationale,51 “however debatable or arguably unwise . . . [it] 
may be.”52 
After disputing the petitioners’ arguments at length,53 the Court 
discussed the second issue and held that copyright extension under 
the CTEA did not violate the First Amendment.54  The Court 
prefaced its analysis with evidence that the Framers found the 
copyright monopoly to be consistent with principles of free 
speech.55  Then the Court explained how copyright law itself has 
“built-in First Amendment accommodations,” such as the 
“idea/expression dichotomy”56 and the “fair use”57 defense.58  
 
 48 Id. at 204–08. 
 49 For Congress’ rationale, see supra text accompanying notes 29–36. 
 50 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204–05 (“‘[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of 
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in order 
to give the public appropriate access to their work product.’”) (quoting Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). 
 51 Id. at 204–08 (“The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, 
judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”). 
 52 Id. at 208.  For arguments against the CTEA, see infra Part I.D. 
 53 Id. at 208–22.  For a detailed account of petitioners’ arguments and the Court’s 
responses, see infra Part I.D.1. 
 54 Id. at 218–21. 
 55 Id. at 219 (“The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time.  
This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are 
compatible with free speech principles.  Indeed, [for the Framers,] copyright’s purpose 
[was] to promote the creation and publication of free expression.”). 
 56 Copyright protects the creator’s expression, but not the underlying ideas. See 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
 57 The statutory provision for the “fair use” defense states that expression may be used 
“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . . . .” See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004); see 
also Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985) 
(explaining that the “[§ 107] listing was not intended to be exhaustive” and identifying 
the following four factors as particularly relevant (but not exclusive) in determining 
whether use was fair: “(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
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Finally, the Court pointed out that the CTEA itself has an 
infringement exception for certain works that are not widely 
available.59 
D. The Arguments in the Supreme Court’s Eldred Opinion 
In addition to analyzing the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Eldred, it will be useful also to review the numerous and varied 
arguments that the Supreme Court addressed in Eldred.60  This is 
important because the arguments and proposed arguments of 
Golan and Kahle should not only be evaluated on their merits,61 
but also considered in reference to the arguments already made and 
judged.62 
1. Petitioners’ Arguments 
The Supreme Court rejected the following arguments by the 
petitioners: 
(1) When applied to existing copyrights, repeated extensions 
consisting of “limited Times” effectively result in 
perpetual copyrights.63 
 
work as a whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work”). 
 58 537 U.S. at 219–20. 
 59 Id. at 220 (The CTEA “allows libraries, archives, and similar institutions to 
‘reproduce’ and ‘distribute, display or perform in facsimile or digital form’ copies of 
certain published works ‘during the last 20 years of any term of copyright . . . for 
purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research’ if the work is not already being 
exploited commercially and further copies are unavailable at a reasonable prices.”) 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2004)).  Congress, in enacting the provision, sought to 
balance (i) the ability of libraries and other nonprofit institutions to preserve and make 
available to patrons (for limited noncommercial uses), copyright material that is not 
reasonably attainable, with (ii) the concern of copyright holders that such an exemption 
non intrude upon their own commercial opportunities. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 18 (1996). 
 60 This Note does not purport to offer an exhaustive and detailed account of every 
argument in Eldred, but a brief summary of the most significant ones discussed in the 
Court’s opinion. 
 61 See infra Parts II–III. 
 62 See infra Part III. 
 63 537 U.S. at 208 (“Petitioners contend that even if the CTEA’s 20-year term 
extension is literally a ‘limited Tim[e],’ permitting Congress to extend existing 
copyrights allows it to evade the ‘limited Times’ constraint by creating effectively 
perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions.”).  In response, the Court observed that 
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(2) Extension of existing copyrights violates the requirement 
of “originality,” because nothing “original” is secured by 
granting a longer term to a work already created.64 
(3) Copyright extension does not “promote the Progress of 
Science” when applied to works that have already been 
created.65  Instead of stimulating new works, it merely 
results in a windfall to authors.66 
(4) Under the Copyright Clause, “Congress may grant to an 
‘Autho[r]’ an ‘exclusive Right’ for a ‘limited Tim[e],’ but 
only in exchange for a ‘Writin[g].’”67  An extension of 
 
“[n]othing before this Court warrants construction of the CTEA’s 20-year term extension 
as a congressional attempt to evade or override the ‘limited Times’ constraint. . . . 
[P]etitioners fail to show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally significant threshold 
with respect to ‘limited Times’ that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did not.”  Id. at 209–
10. 
 64 Id. at 210–11 (Relying on the Court’s holding in Feist that there is not copyright 
protection for “‘a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking 
or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent,’ . . . petitioners urge that even if a work is 
sufficiently ‘original’ to qualify for copyright protection in the first instance, any 
extension of the copyright’s duration is impermissible because, once published, a work is 
no longer original.”) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
349 (1991)).  The Court replied that Feist “addressed the core question of 
copyrightability, i.e., the ‘creative spark’ a work must have to be eligible for copyright 
protection at all[,] . . . [but it] did not touch on the duration of copyright protection. . . . 
The decision did not construe the ‘limited Times’ for which a work may be protected, and 
the originality requirement has no bearing on that prescription.” Id. at 211. 
 65 Id. at 211–12 (“Petitioners maintain that the preambular language [in the Copyright 
Clause, conferring upon Congress the ‘Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science,’] 
identifies the sole end to which Congress may legislate; accordingly they conclude, the 
meaning of ‘limited Times’ must be ‘determined in light of that specified end.’”) (quoting 
Brief for Petitioners at 19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618)).  The 
Court acknowledges that the Copyright Clause acts as a “limitation,” but responds that “it 
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright 
Clause’s objectives.” Id. at 212.  The Court also declares that “Congress’ unbroken 
practice [of adjusting copyright terms for both future and existing works] since the 
founding generation . . . overwhelms petitioners’ argument that the CTEA’s extension of 
existing copyrights fails per se to ‘promote the Progress of Science.’” Id. at 213–14. 
 66 Id. at 211–12.  The Court refutes this conclusion, explaining that various rationales 
have been cited for the CTEA that “provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the 
CTEA ‘promote[s] the Progress of Science.’” Id. at 213.  For Congress’ rationale, see 
supra text accompanying notes 29–36. 
 67 Id. at 214.  “Congress’ power to confer copyright protection, petitioners argue, is 
thus contingent upon an exchange: The author of an original work receives an ‘exclusive 
Right’ for a ‘limited Tim[e]’ in exchange for a dedication to the public thereafter.” Id. 
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existing copyrights in exchange for nothing violates this 
quid pro quo requirement.68 
(5) Congressional enactments pursuant to the Copyright 
Clause should be subject to heightened judicial review.69 
(6) “[T]he CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech 
that fails heightened judicial review under the First 
Amendment.”70 
2. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion 
Additional arguments were raised in dissenting opinions.  
Justice Stevens argued: 
(1) Fairness dictates that the public’s bargain with authors 
should not be retroactively changed, unless the public is 
compensated for the taking.71 
 
 68 Id.  The Court objects to petitioner’s characterization of the Copyright Clause’s quid 
pro quo. Id.  The patent cases describing a quid pro quo are distinguishable because 
“patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange.” Id. at 216.  Nevertheless, 
“[g]iven the consistent placement of existing copyright holders in parity with future 
holders, the author of a work created in the last 170 years would reasonably comprehend, 
as the [benefit] offered her [as inducement for creation], a copyright not only for the time 
in place when protection is gained, but also for any renewal or extension legislated during 
that time.” Id. at 214–15. 
 69 Id. at 217–18.  “Specifically, petitioners ask [the Court] to apply the ‘congruence and 
proportionality’ standard described in cases evaluating exercises of Congress’ power 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.  The Court declines to use that standard, 
stating that the Court has “never applied that standard outside the § 5 context; it does not 
hold sway for judicial review of legislation enacted, as copyright laws are, pursuant to 
Article I authorization.”  Id. at 218. 
 70 Id.  The Court “rejects petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny 
on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and 
safeguards.” Id. at 218–19.  For the Court’s analysis of copyright’s built-in First 
Amendment protections, see supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 71 Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a 
patent, the Government as a representative of the public sought to modify the bargain by 
shortening the term of the patent in order to accelerate public access to the invention.  
The fairness considerations that underlie the constitutional protections against ex post 
facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts would presumably disable 
Congress from making such a retroactive change in the public’s bargain with an inventor 
without providing compensation for the taking.  Those same considerations should 
protect members of the public who make plans to exploit an invention as soon as it enters 
the public domain from a retroactive modification of the bargain that extends the term of 
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(2) Congress can act under the Copyright/Patent Clause only 
to encourage new works or advance the public domain;72 
extending existing copyrights achieves neither of these 
goals.73 
(3) The history of retroactive extensions of existing patents 
and copyrights is “replete with actions that were 
unquestionably unconstitutional.”74  Despite the 
majority’s contention that “[h]istory reveals an unbroken 
congressional practice of granting to authors of works 
with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions,”75 
“history is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the 
Sonny Bono Act.”76  Moreover, the Court is responsible 
 
the patent monopoly.”). But cf. supra note 68 (discussing the Court’s rejection of 
petitioners’ quid pro quo argument). 
 72 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We have recognized that these 
twin purposes of encouraging new works and adding to the public domain apply to 
copyrights as well as patents.  Thus, with regard to copyrights on motion pictures, we 
have clearly identified the overriding interest in the ‘release to the public of the products 
of [the author’s] creative genius.’”) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).  “And, as with patents, we have emphasized that the 
overriding purpose of providing a reward for authors’ creative activity is to motivate that 
activity and ‘to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired.’” Id. at 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). But cf. 
supra notes 65–66 (summarizing the Court’s response to petitioners’ claim that the 
CTEA does not “promote the Progress of Science”). 
 73 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Instead, “[e]x post facto 
extensions of copyrights result in a gratuitous transfer of wealth from the public to 
authors, publishers, and their successors in interest.” Id. at 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 74 Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For example, “Congress passed private bills 
either directly extending patents or allowing otherwise untimely applicants to apply for 
patent extensions for approximately 75 patents between 1790 and 1875.  Of these 75 
patents, at least 56 had already fallen into the public domain.” Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  In light of the Court’s pronouncement that “‘Congress may not authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public 
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available[,]’” this “repeated 
practice [of extending patent terms] was patently unconstitutional [and it] completely 
undermines the majority’s reliance on this history as ‘significant.’” Id. (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966)). 
 75 Id. at 200; see also id. at 200–04 (detailing the history of extending term lengths on 
existing copyrights and patents, and Congress’ policy for doing so). 
 76 Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The 1790 Act “does not provide support for the 
proposition that Congress can extend pre-existing federal protections retroactively. . . . 
[The] Act created, rather than extended, copyright protection.” Id. at 231–32 (Stevens, J., 
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for invalidating an unconstitutional practice, no matter 
how long Congress has acted invalidly.77 
(4) Though copyright extension may encourage restoration 
and digitalization of old films, this does not validate 
extension of all existing copyrights.78  This justification is 
invalid because it does not relate to the encouragement of 
new works, any original expression could be copyrighted 
without the CTEA, the preservation rationale applies 
equally to works already in the public domain, and 
wholesale extension far overreaches the limited goal of 
film restoration.79 
3. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that the CTEA 
lacks the required rationality because it regulates expression and it 
is “not pure economic regulation.”80  He described the harms that 
the CTEA presents,81 and disputed the alleged benefits.82 
 
dissenting).  Nor should significance be attached to the 1831 Act. Id. at 236 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  “Congress based its authority to pass the amendment on . . . [the] sweat-of-
the-brow view of copyright, [which] was emphatically rejected by this Court in 1834 in 
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. [591,] 661, 8 L.Ed. 1055.” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  “In 
1861, Congress amended the term of patents . . . . This change was not retroactive, but 
rather only applied to ‘all patents hereafter granted.’” Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
In sum, history reveals not only the existence of retroactive extensions, but varied 
practices, some of which were “unquestionably unconstitutional.” Id. (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Therefore, “history is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the [CTEA].” 
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 77 Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens cites INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 103 (1983), for the proposition that “the fact Congress has repeatedly acted on a 
mistaken interpretation of the Constitution does not qualify our duty to invalidate an 
unconstitutional practice when it is finally challenged in an appropriate case.” Id. 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 78 Id. at 239–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 80 Id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is no need in this case to characterize 
[the] review as a search for ‘“congruence and proportionality,”’ or as some other 
variation of what this Court has called ‘intermediate scrutiny’ . . . . Rather, it is necessary 
only to recognize that this statute involves not pure economic regulation, but regulation 
of expression, and what may count as rational where economic regulation is at issue is 
not necessarily rational where we focus on expression—in a Nation constitutionally 
dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning, and culture.”  The 
CTEA does not meet this standard because “the significant benefits that it bestows are 
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a) Harms 
(1) Although “only 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 
years old retain commercial value,” the twenty-year 
extension will result in several billion dollars extra in 
royalties for the holders of these 2% of existing 
copyrights, at the expense of the American public.83  The 
windfall accrues mostly to the copyright holders of works 
that have already earned “many billions of dollars” in 
royalties.84  The result is that “unnecessarily high prices 
will unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic works.”85 
(2) For an additional twenty years, one seeking to use or 
reproduce a copyrighted work will have to seek 
permission from the copyright holder.86  “[T]he 
permissions requirement can inhibit or prevent the use of 
old works (particularly those without commercial 
value) . . . because it may prove expensive to track down 
or to contract with the copyright holder. . . .”87  
“[H]istorians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database 
operators, and researchers of all kinds” will be prevented 
from using copyrighted works of little or no commercial 
 
private, not public; . . . it threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that the 
Copyright Clause embodies; and . . . it cannot find justification in any significant Clause-
related objective.” (citations omitted)). But see id. at 205 n.10 (The Court rejects Justice 
Breyer’s heightened standard: “The novelty of the ‘rational basis’ approach he presents is 
plain.  Rather than subjecting Congress’ legislative choices in the copyright area to 
heightened judicial scrutiny, we have stressed that ‘it is not our role to alter the delicate 
balance Congress has labored to achieve.’  Congress’ exercise of its Copyright Clause 
authority must be rational, but Justice Breyer’s stringent version of rationality is 
unknown to our literary property jurisprudence.”) (citations omitted). 
 81 Id. at 248–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 82 Id. at 254–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 83 Id. at 248–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing figures from Edward Rappaport, CRS 
Report for Congress, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values (1998) 
[hereinafter CRS Report]). 
 84 Id. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing CRS Report, supra note 83, at 16). 
 85 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer presents evidence that works such as 
novels are cheaper when they come out of copyright. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
CRS Report, supra note 83, at 3). 
 86 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 250 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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value.88  Moreover, the infringement exception for 
libraries and archives89 will not be sufficient to remedy 
these permissions-related harms because its coverage is 
too limited and the “reasonable investigation” 
requirement is too vague.90 
b) Refutation of Claimed Benefits 
(1) The additional incentives to an author from an extension 
from life-plus-fifty years to life-plus-seventy years are 
meaningless because (i) a creator cannot reasonably 
expect to create a work that will still be earning money 
during those final twenty years91 and (ii) royalties that far 
in the future, discounted to present value, are almost 
worthless anyways.92  In fact, when discounting is taken 
 
 88 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer observes that although permission costs of 
copyright law are inevitable, they are “dramatically increase[d]” with the CTEA. Id. at 
251 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  “The older the work, the less likely it retains commercial 
value, and the harder it will likely prove to find the current copyright holder.  The older 
the work, the more likely it will prove useful to the historian, artist, or teacher.” Id. 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 89 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2004); supra note 59 (description of statute). 
 90 537 U.S. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The exemption] applies only where the 
copy is made for the special listed purposes; it simply permits a library (not any other 
subsequent users) to make ‘a copy’ for those purposes; it covers only ‘published’ works 
not ‘subject to normal commercial exploitation’ and not obtainable, apparently not even 
as a used copy, at a ‘reasonable price’; and it insists that the library assure itself through 
‘reasonable investigation’ that these conditions have been met.  What database proprietor 
can rely on so limited an exemption—particularly when the phrase ‘reasonable 
investigation’ is so open-ended and particularly if the database has commercial, as well as 
noncommercial, aspects?”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)). 
 91 Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“No potential author can reasonably believe that he 
has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive commercially long 
enough for the copyright extension to matter.  After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2% 
of all copyrights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more 
(a typical pre-extension copyright term)—must be far smaller.”) (citing CRS Report, 
supra note 83, at 7). 
 92 Id. at 254–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] 1% likelihood of earning $100 annually 
for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents today.”) 
(citing Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 5–7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 
S.Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618)). But see id. at 207 n.15 (“Justice Breyer urges that the 
economic incentives accompanying copyright term extension are too insignificant to 
‘mov[e]’ any author with a ‘rational economic perspective.’  Calibrating rational 
economic incentives, however, . . . is a task primarily for Congress, not the courts.  
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into consideration, the CTEA produces a period of 
protection that is worth more than 99.8% of perpetual 
protection—a result “difficult to square with the 
Constitution’s insistence on ‘limited Times.’”93  Most 
importantly, with respect to works already created, “the 
statute creates no economic incentive at all.”94 
(2) The argument that uniformity with European copyright 
terms justifies the CTEA is weak because the statute does 
not create uniformity “with respect to the lion’s share of 
the economically significant works that it affects—all 
works made ‘for hire’ and all existing works created prior 
to 1978.”95  Moreover the benefits of partial uniformity 
are exceedingly thin.96  Because discounting for present 
value minimizes the value of future royalties, few authors 
will decide where to publish based the additional twenty 
years protection.97 
(3) Although there may be circumstances where a longer term 
will give publishers and movie studios incentives to 
restore old works, this concern does not permit Congress 
to extend terms.98  This is because the Copyright Clause 
 
Congress heard testimony from a number of prominent artists [including Quincy Jones, 
Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos Santana]; each expressed the belief that the 
copyright system’s assurance of fair compensation for themselves and their heirs was an 
incentive to create.”). 
 93 Id. at 255–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for George A. Akerlof). But see id. 
at 209 n.16 (In response to Justice Breyer, the Court observes: “It is doubtful . . . [that 
the] architects of our Nation, in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription, thought in 
terms of the calculator rather than the calendar.”). 
 94 Id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 95 Id. at 257–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  “With respect to those works the American 
statute produces an extended term of 95 years while comparable European rights in ‘for 
hire’ works last for periods that vary from 50 years to 70 years to life plus 70 years. . . . 
[Also,] the statute [does not] create uniformity with respect to anonymous or 
pseudonymous works.” Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 96 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97 Id. at 259 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (responding to the argument that “because 
uncorrected disuniformity would permit Europe, not the United States, to hold out the 
prospect of protection lasting for ‘life plus 70 years’ (instead of ‘life plus 50 years’), a 
potential author might decide to publish initially in Europe, delaying American 
publication”) (citing Brief for Respondent at 38, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 
(2003) (No. 01-618)). 
 98 Id. at 260–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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“assumes an initial grant of monopoly, designed primarily 
to encourage creation, followed by termination of the 
monopoly grant in order to promote dissemination of 
already-created works.”99  The Clause “assumes that it is 
the disappearance of the monopoly grant, not its 
perpetuation, that will, on balance, promote the 
dissemination of works already in existence.”100 
(4) Although it is urged that term extension benefits the 
American entertainment industry, the Copyright Clause 
does not sanction enhancing the copyright holder’s 
monopoly power for the purpose of generating higher 
corporate profits.101 
(5) An increase in lifespan does not support term extension 
because the “life” element of the 1976 Act’s life-plus-fifty 
term already adjusts the term in response to this 
phenomenon.102 
E. Golan v. Ashcroft 
1. The Plaintiffs and Their Injuries 
The Golan plaintiffs are individuals and businesses that rely on 
public domain works for commercial or artistic endeavors.  
Lawrence Golan is a conductor who puts on free symphonic 
concerts to promote classical music.103  Constrained by a very 
limited budget and the prohibitive costs of renting sheet music for 
copyrighted works, Golan depends on public domain works for his 
orchestras.104  The twenty-year term extension under the CTEA has 
prevented Golan from selecting various important twentieth 
 
 99 Id. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 101 Id. at 262–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I can find nothing in the Copyright Clause 
that would authorize Congress to enhance the copyright grant’s monopoly power, likely 
leading to higher prices both at home and abroad, solely in order to produce higher 
foreign earnings.  That objective is not a copyright objective.”). 
 102 Id. at 263 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 103 First Amended Complaint at 19, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 
2004) (No. 01-B-1854). 
 104 Id. at 20. 
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century works for performance by his orchestras.105  This result 
unites the Golan plaintiffs.106  In interrupting the annual flow of 
new works into the public domain and increasing the term lengths, 
the CTEA will, for twenty years, deprive the plaintiffs of using 
works they would otherwise have been able to use.107 
Lessig argues that these deprivations are overly burdensome on 
public domain beneficiaries.  He documents the dramatic increases 
in term lengths; presently, in part due to the CTEA, the 
“historically maximum average term of 32.2 years [has been 
tripled].”108  Until the 1976 Act, shorter maximum terms of 
 
 105 Id. at 21.  “In particular, CTEA has effectively prevented Golan from selecting for 
public performance works of several great American composers such as George 
Gershwin and Aaron Copland, as well as works of great foreign composers such as 
Prokofiev, Dmitri Shostakovich, Igor Stravinsky, Jean Sibelius, and Maurice Ravel.” Id. 
 106 Plaintiff Richard Kapp is a conductor and plaintiff ESS.A.Y Recordings is a record 
label started and headed by Kapp. Id. at 4–5.  The complaint alleges that “[b]efore CTEA 
was enacted, Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings relied on the yearly natural progression of 
copyrighted works into the public domain due to the expiry of the term.  CTEA, however, 
puts an end to this vital supply of public domain works, at least for 20 years.” Id. at 24.  
Plaintiff Symphony of the Canyons is a not-for-profit community orchestra that cannot 
afford the costs involved with performing copyrighted works. Id. at 28.  Similar to Golan, 
Kapp, and ESS.A.Y Recordings, Symphony of the Canyons has been injured by the 
CTEA’s 20-year extension, which has “greatly harmed the anticipated supply of public 
domain works for Symphony of the Canyons to perform.” Id.  Plaintiff Ron Hall, d/b/a 
Festival Films, sells public domain films and supplies public domain stock footage that is 
used in television programs and films. Id. at 30.  “Before CTEA was enacted, Festival 
Films relied on the natural progression of copyrighted works into the public domain each 
year due to the expiry of the term.  Such progression into the public domain was vital for 
Festival Films to offer ‘new’ titles of public domain works.  CTEA, however, puts an end 
to this vital supply of public domain works for 20 years.” Id.  Plaintiff John McDonough, 
d/b/a Timeless Video Alternatives International, preserves and distributes public domain 
movies and television programs. Id. at 32.  Because of the CTEA, McDonough cannot 
rely on the “natural progression of copyrighted works into the public domain” to increase 
his inventory; the CTEA “puts an end to [his] vital supply of public domain works for 20 
years.” Id. at 33.  Even worse is the possibility that because of the extra twenty years of 
protection, early films, which were made on material that deteriorates rapidly, will be lost 
forever if the copyright holder does not exist or intend to preserve the film. Id. at 34. 
 107 See id. at 18 (“In establishing their businesses and pursuing their creative endeavors, 
Plaintiffs relied on the existence of [the] natural progression of works into the public 
domain.  Each year would bring ‘new’ public domain works that Plaintiffs could perform 
or make available for the public.  What CTEA does is to put an end to this natural 
progression of works into the public domain for a 20-year period. . . . [N]o copyrighted 
works will enter the public domain at all until January 1, 2019. . . .”). 
 108 Id. at 14 (“CTEA has now thus effectively tripled the historically maximum average 
term of 32.2 years.  After CTEA, all subsisting copyrights vesting before 1978 will 
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protection and renewal requirements resulted in average copyright 
terms that never exceeded 32.2 years.109  Since 1976, however, 
terms have been extended and renewal requirements have been 
eliminated.110  “These two changes together mean[] that 
copyrighted works automatically receive the maximum copyright 
term, whether or not the work continues to have any commercial 
value.”111  Plaintiffs are unfairly burdened because they relied on 
“[e]ach year . . . bring[ing] ‘new’ public domain works that [they] 
could perform or make available to the public.”112 
2. The Legal Argument and Its Dismissal for Failure to State a 
Claim 
Lessig argues that the CTEA is unconstitutional because it 
creates a term so long that it can no longer be considered 
“limited:”113 
The difference between the value of a perpetual copyright 
and the value of the CTEA term is inconsequential . . . .  
The present extension will produce a copyright period of 
protection that is worth more than 99.8% of the value of 
protection in perpetuity, leaving less than .2% of the work’s 
value for the public.  Therefore, the Framers would have 
viewed the terms set by the CTEA as effectively or 
virtually perpetual.114 
 
receive a 95 year term at a minimum; work created after 1978 will receive either a 95 
year term, or a term lasting 70 years after the author’s death.  The result is that the 
average copyright term for all copyrighted works is now the maximum term—a term that 
is itself staggeringly long.”). 
 109 Id. at 12. 
 110 See id. (“In 1976, Congress eliminated the renewal requirements for works created 
on or after January 1, 1978.  From that point on, corporate works received protection for 
95 years, while works by natural authors were protected for 50 years after the author’s 
death.  Then in 1989, Congress eliminated the renewal requirement for any subsisting 
copyrights vested before 1978.  All subsisting works were then guaranteed a term of 75 
years, whether or not the authors had any continuing interest in protection. . . .  On 
October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed CTEA into law.  CTEA generally grants an 
additional 20 years to the term of copyright.”). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 18. 
 113 Id. at 3–4. 
 114 Id. at 40–41. 
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This argument is identical to one made by Justice Breyer in his 
Eldred dissent, and specifically rejected by the Court.115 
The documentation of harms caused by the CTEA116 is much 
more interesting than the legal argument, which does not directly 
encompass the harms detailed.  The CTEA claim is weak and 
correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim.117  Chief Judge 
Lewis T. Babcock of the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado held that the plaintiffs’ claim was foreclosed 
by Eldred.118  “The Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft held that 
the extension of the copyright term in the CTEA was 
constitutional, in that it was not effectively or virtually perpetual, 
despite the fact that the Petitioners there did not directly challenge 
the time-span provided for in the CTEA.”119  Plaintiffs’ claim that 
 
 115 See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 116 See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.  These harms are the basis of the 
claim discussed in Part II, infra. 
 117 The CTEA count was dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Golan v. Ashcroft, 
310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Colo. 2004). 
 118 Id. at 1218. 
 119 Id. 
In Eldred, the Supreme Court ruled, on the Petitioners’ claim that Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Copyright and Patent clause, that the CTEA 
did not violate the constitutional requirement that copyrights endure for 
“limited Times.”  Although the Petitioners in Eldred did “not challenge the life-
plus-70-years’ timespan itself,” id. 537 U.S. at 193, 123 S.Ct. 769, the Supreme 
Court approved the Court of Appeals determination—when addressing the 
argument that Congress evaded the “limited Times” constraint by creating 
effectively perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions—that “a regime of 
perpetual copyrights ‘clearly is not the situation before us.’” Id. at 209, 123 
S.Ct. 769 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 379).  In support of this 
determination, the Supreme Court noted that Copyright Extension Acts in 1831, 
1909, and 1976, “did not create perpetual copyrights, and neither does the 
CTEA.” Id. at 210, 123 S.Ct. 769.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the argument made by Justice Breyer in his dissent, and 
advanced by Plaintiffs here, that the “economic effect” of the CTEA, which 
allegedly creates a copyright term worth 99.8% of the value of a perpetual 
copyright, makes the term “virtually perpetual.” Id. at 209 n. 16, 123 S.Ct. 769. 
The Supreme Court indicated that “[i]t is doubtful that those architects of our 
Nation, in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription, thought in terms of the 
calculator rather than the calendar.” Id. 
Id. 
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the “Supreme Court expressly did not reach the question”120 is 
incorrect; the Supreme Court’s opinion on the matter was clear.121 
F. Kahle v. Ashcroft 
1. The Kahle Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff Brewster Kahle is the Chairman of the Board of 
plaintiff Internet Archive.122  “Internet Archive’s principal activity 
is to build an ‘Internet library,’ with the purpose of offering 
permanent and free access for researchers, historians, and scholars 
to works—including audio, books, films, websites, and software—
that exist in digital format.”123  It would like to include “‘orphan’ 
works—i.e., books that remain under copyright, but are out of print 
and therefore not widely available to the public.”124 
Plaintiff Richard Prelinger is the President of plaintiff Prelinger 
Associates, Inc.125 (“Prelinger Archives”).  Prelinger Archives 
strives “to collect, preserve, and facilitate access to films of 
historic significance that have not been collected elsewhere, or 
made commercially available elsewhere.  Included are films 
produced by and for many hundreds of important U.S. 
corporations, nonprofit organizations, trade associations, 
 
 120 First Amended Complaint at 3, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 
2004) (No. 01-B-1854). 
 121 See supra note 119.  The Golan plaintiffs wrongfully equate the Eldred petitioners 
not expressly raising the issue with the Supreme Court not expressly reaching it. 
 122 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 3, Kahle v. Ashcroft (C 04-1127 
BZ), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2005). 
 123 Id. at 3.  “The archive has over 30 billion Web pages, archived from the beginning of 
1996.  It hosts over 33,705 audio, video, and texts-based works, available for free 
download from its site.  The Internet Archive also hosts 3,173 moving images, ranging 
from graduate-level mathematics lectures to independent news and ephemeral films.  The 
archive’s text collection contains 21,633 public domain works, including the first 10,551 
books digitized pursuant to a ‘Million Book’ project.  Users have contributed 7,643 live 
concert recordings, 1,043 studio recordings, and 213 radio programs to the audio 
collection.” Id. at 5–6. 
 124 Id. at 3.  Plaintiffs Kahle and Internet Archive note that while they wish to provide 
access to “orphaned” works, they would acquiesce to individual copyright holders’ 
requests that their works not be included in the archive. Id. at 18. 
 125 Id. at 3–4. 
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community and interest groups, and educational institutions.”126  
“Prelinger Archives wishes to make . . . orphan films available to 
patrons on the same basis as the archive’s public domain materials, 
[but] the process of locating rights holders for many of these works 
is too costly and uncertain.”127 
2. The Plaintiffs’ Injuries 
Lessig argues that the present “unconditional copyright 
regime” injures the plaintiffs because it grants copyright protection 
regardless of the copyright holder’s preferences.128  He continues: 
“[T]he law129 has . . . produced an extraordinary ‘orphan class’ of 
 
 126 Id. at 3–4.  “The collection, including [a] portion [that was] acquired by the Library 
of Congress, currently contains over 10% of the total production of ephemeral films 
between 1927 and 1987. . . .” Id. at 4. 
 127 Id. at 18. 
 128 See id. at 9–10 (“A conditional copyright regime limits copyright protection to those 
who take affirmative steps to claim copyright protection.  For example, a regime that 
requires registration of a copyrighted work, or the deposit of a copyrighted work, or the 
marking of a copyrighted work with copyright notice, or the renewal of the term of 
protection, is a conditional regime.  An unconditional copyright regime grants copyright 
protection whether or not the author or his assigns takes any affirmative steps to claim 
copyright protection.  For example, a regime that grants protection whether or not the 
work is registered, deposited, marked, or renewed, is an unconditional copyright regime.  
In each instance, protection is automatic, regardless of the will of the author or his 
assigns. . . . The consequence of requiring . . . affirmative steps to secure copyright 
protection was that the overwhelming majority of published works either passed 
immediately into the public domain (because they were never registered or notice was not 
given), or passed into the public domain after a relatively short term of protection 
(because their terms were never renewed).”). 
 129 See id. at 12 (“In 1976, Congress abolished any registration, deposit, or renewal 
requirement for works created on or after January 1, 1978.  These changes meant that the 
grant of protection for copyright extended automatically to all works for the full term of 
copyright, without requiring any affirmative actions by the author or his assigns.  
Congress has retained a voluntary registration system.  In 1988, Congress passed the 
Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853-2861, which 
prospectively eliminated the notice requirement, and also removed registration as a pre-
requisite for filing an infringement action for the works of foreign authors.  Congress has 
retained a requirement that U.S.-based works be registered before an infringement suit 
based upon the work is brought.  In 1992, Congress passed the Copyright Renewal Act, 
Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 266, which indiscriminately renewed all copyrights dating 
from January 1, 1964 to December 31, 1977.  Though historical patterns suggest that no 
more than 8–15% of the copyrights during that period would have been renewed, 
Congress extended the protection of copyright to all subsisting copyrights even in the 
absence of any expressed desire by the copyright owners to secure the benefits of an 
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creative work—work that the author has no continuing interest to 
control, but which, because of the burdens of the law, no one else 
can effectively and efficiently archive, preserve, or build upon in 
the digital environment for a term now reaching almost a 
century.”130  The CTEA exacerbated this situation because it 
“unconditionally extended by 20 years the term of all subsisting 
copyrights, . . . regardless of any expressed desire by the copyright 
owners to secure the benefits of an additional term.”131  It was also 
the “first statute to extend the copyright term for works that had 
not been filtered by a renewal requirement [(i.e. registered works 
published between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1978)].”132 
The Kahle lawsuit focuses on these works from 1964 to 
1978.133  Lessig argues: 
There is no continuing copyright-related interest in 
continuing the protection of copyright for the vast majority 
of this work.  While [the burden of restricted access, 
pursuant to an unconditional copyright regime,] may be 
slight in the context of commercially viable works—since 
 
additional term.  Finally, in 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827-2828, which unconditionally 
extended by 20 years the term of all subsisting copyrights, including those automatically 
extended by the Copyright Extension Act, regardless of any expressed desire by the 
copyright owners to secure the benefits of an additional term.”). 
 130 Id. at 1–2.  “Whereas the traditional contours of a conditional copyright regime 
produced, through the renewal requirement, a fresh record of copyright ownership, an 
unconditional copyright regime guarantees no mechanism to identify the current or even 
presumptive owner of copyrighted material.  This makes subsequent reuse practically 
impossible for the vast majority of uses that Plaintiffs would enable.” Id. at 13. 
 131 Id. at 12. 
 132 Id. at 14 (“For registered works published between January 1, 1923 and December 
31, 1963, CTEA extended the term of any subsisting copyright by 20 years.  But because 
the average renewal rate for work published between 1923 and 1926 was just 15%, 85% 
of the work originally copyrighted during that period had already passed into the public 
domain.  Thus, while CTEA extended the terms of subsisting copyrights, the filter of 
renewal had already eliminated the burden of copyright regulation from the vast majority 
of copyrights granted during this period.  For registered works published between 
January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1978, CTEA extended the term of subsisting 
copyrights by 20 years.  But because the Copyright Renewal Act had granted an 
automatic renewal to all subsisting copyrights not yet in their renewal term, CTEA 
extended the copyright term of a class of works of which, according to historical data, 
85% would never have been renewed.”). 
 133 Id. at 15. 
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the fact of commercial availability makes access possible, 
and makes identifying the copyright owner relatively 
easy—for the vast majority of works in this period that are 
not currently commercially available, this unconditional 
regime effectively orphans them.  Internet based archives, 
libraries, film restorers, and follow-on creators have no 
viable or reasonable way to identify copyright owners for 
this creative work.  And with respect to this work, there is 
no copyright-related benefit from abolishing 
registration. . . . The result is that a vast number of 
copyrighted yet no longer commercially valuable works sit 
idle rather than enriching public knowledge.134 
3. The Legal Arguments and Their Dismissal for Failure to 
State a Claim 
There are one First Amendment and two “limited Times” 
arguments.  According to Lessig, First Amendment scrutiny is 
required because the change from a conditional copyright regime 
to an unconditional one alters “the traditional contours of copyright 
protection.”135  Freedom of speech has been burdened because 
“even though historical data suggest that more than 85% of this 
work would never have had its copyright renewed, the law has 
automatically extended the term for all of this work by 67 
years.”136 
The first “limited Times” argument duplicates the argument 
made in Golan.137  It alleges that the CTEA violated the Copyright 
Clause’s “limited Times” requirement because the lengthened term 
of protection granted by the CTEA is effectively perpetual.138  
Under the conditional copyright regime, the average term was 
 
 134 Id. at 15–16, 18. 
 135 Id. at 19–20.  Lessig backs up this statement by repeating the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Eldred that “‘when . . . Congress has not altered the traditional contours of 
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.’” Id. at 19.  “By 
implication, [continues Lessig,] when Congress does alter ‘the traditional contours of 
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny’ should be necessary.” Id. at 19. 
 136 Id. at 20–21. 
 137 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 138 Id. at 21–22. 
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never longer than 34.1 years.  Now the average term is 95 years for 
corporate works.139 
The second “limited Times” argument challenges the CTEA’s 
constitutionality: 
to the extent [it] extend[s] the terms of copyrights that have 
not, and will not, be renewed. . . .  The Court in Eldred did 
not consider that every extension before CTEA applied to 
works whose terms had to be renewed.  CTEA was the first 
statute to purport to extend the term of works that would 
never be filtered by a requirement of renewal.  This change 
in a fundamental contour of copyright’s free speech 
protections should lead the Court to reconsider its decision 
in Eldred, and hold that within an unconditional copyright 
regime, Congress has no power to extend the terms of 
existing copyrights.140 
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California dismissed all three claims 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).141  The First Amendment argument 
was unsuccessful because Judge Chesney held that transition from 
a conditional to an unconditional copyright regime did not alter the 
traditional contours of copyright law.142  She first reviewed the 
traditional contours discussed by the Supreme Court in Eldred—
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use exception143—and 
discussed generally the Court’s observations on the compatibility 
of free speech and copyright.144  She then distinguished the 
 
 139 Id. at 22. 
 140 Id. at 2, 25. 
 141 Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1127, 2004 WL 2663157, at **8, 18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
19, 2004). 
 142 Id. at **16–18. 
 143 Id. at *16; see also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s invocation of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use in Eldred). 
 144 Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at **16–17; see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 
(2003) (“‘[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.  By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.’”) (quoting Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)); id. at 221 (“The First 
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or to decline to make—one’s own 
speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 
speeches.  To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s 
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registration, renewal, deposit, and notice requirements of the 
conditional copyright regime as “formalities [that] do not alter the 
scope of copyright protection, but merely determine the procedures 
necessary to obtain or maintain such protection.  Because changes 
to requirements of this nature do not alter the substantive rights 
granted by copyright, . . . [the CTEA] do[es] not alter the 
‘traditional contours of copyright protection.’”145 
The first “limited Times” argument failed for the same reason 
it failed in Golan v. Ashcroft, namely that the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Eldred foreclosed the claim.146 
The second “limited Times” claim also was precluded by 
Eldred: “The Supreme Court held in Eldred that Congress does not 
violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment by extending 
the copyright terms of existing copyrights.”147  The district court 
held that whether Congress’ power to extend copyright terms is 
affected by the change from a conditional to an unconditional 
copyright regime (and whether this alters a fundamental contour of 
copyright’s free speech protections) can only be determined by the 
Supreme Court, which would have to reverse Eldred to decide for 
the plaintiffs.148  Lacking authority to overturn Eldred, the district 
court dismissed the claim.149 
Lessig intends to appeal the Kahle decision to the Ninth 
Circuit.150 
 
built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them.”); id. (“[The 
CTEA] protects authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation.  Protection of 
that order does not raise the free speech concerns present when the government compels 
or burdens the communication of particular facts or ideas.”). 
 145 Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at *17. 
 146 Id. at *8 (citing Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217–18 (D. Colo. 2004)); 
see supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text (explaining why the Golan court rejected 
the perpetual term claim). 
 147 Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192–94 (2003)). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Stan. L. Sch. Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Kahle v. Ashcroft Case Page, at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 
2005) (posting of Christopher Sprigman, co-litigator of Kahle v. Ashcroft, Dec. 3, 2004). 
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II. FIRST CLAIM: THE CTEA IS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE THE 
EXTENDED COPYRIGHT TERMS ARE OVERLY BURDENSOME ON 
THOSE WHO PUBLISH PUBLIC DOMAIN WORKS 
The legal arguments did not succeed in Golan and Kahle, 
largely because the courts held that they were foreclosed by 
Eldred.151  Although the legal arguments were dismissed on 
summary judgment motions, Lessig raised interesting policy 
concerns that were not part of the legal claims.152  Parts II and III 
of this Note evaluate legal claims based on those policy arguments, 
specifically that the CTEA is unlawful because (i) the extended 
copyright terms are overly burdensome on those who publish 
public domain works and (ii) the absence of renewal provisions 
results in works being locked-up, regardless of the preferences of 
the copyright holders.153  This Part will present arguments in favor 
of, and in contention with, the first of these claims. 
Lessig documents the adverse consequences that the CTEA 
imposes upon businesses and nonprofit associations that rely upon 
public domain works.154  In many cases, these groups will be 
ultimately restricted from using works that, absent the CTEA, they 
would have been able to use.155  Yet changes in law inevitably 
cause economic harm to individuals, and not all of these harms 
merit restitution.156  Two questions are thus raised: (1) Do the 
public domain publishers have a claim for the damage to their 
businesses?  (2) Should there be a remedy for them?  In resolving 
these questions, Part II evaluates two possible bases for a legal 
claim: the Fifth Amendment “Takings” clause and an economic 
theory for reliance damages. 
 
 151 See supra Parts I.E.2 (Golan), I.F.3 (Kahle). 
 152 See supra Parts I.E.1 (Golan), I.F.2 (Kahle). 
 153 See Krause, supra note 4, at 40–41. 
 154 See supra Part I.E.1 (Golan plaintiffs); Brief for Petitioners at 3–7, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618) (offering specific examples of how the 
Eldred petitioners will be harmed by the CTEA’s restriction on “their ability to build 
upon and use content”). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See, e.g., Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.) 
(“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”). 
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A. Fifth Amendment “Takings” Clause Claim 
Public domain publishers would be entitled to compensation if, 
as applied to pre-existing works, the CTEA constitutes a taking.157  
For there to be a takings claim, private property must be taken for 
public use, without the payment of “just compensation.”158  
Because there is no serious contention that such “just 
compensation” has been made to public domain publishers,159 only 
the former two issues require resolution: whether the public 
domain publishers’ right to use works in the public domain 
constitutes the kind of “private property” that the Fifth 
Amendment governs, and whether term extension is for “public 
use.” 
1. Does the Right to Use Works in the Public Domain 
Constitute Private Property? 
Professor Eben Moglen has opined that “in all justice[,] the 
Supreme Court would be compelled to agree that you cannot take 
the reversioner’s interest in the public domain without 
payment.”160  Noting their common law origins, he compares 
copyrights to estates, and observes that copyrights are really just “a 
conveyance for term of years or a life interest plus a term of years, 
with . . .  reversion to the public domain.”161  He then cites Hawaii 
 
 157 A taking is a term of art defined in various Supreme Court cases.  This section will 
evaluate those cases relevant to the public domain publishers’ interests in works with 
terms set to expire, then extended.  For the benefit of the reader, a general definition for a 
taking is: “[t]he government’s actual or effective acquisition of private property either by 
ousting the owner or by destroying the property or severely impairing its utility.  There is 
a taking of property when government action directly interferes with or substantially 
disturbs the owner’s use and enjoyment of that property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 158 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “private property [shall not] be taken for 
public use, without just compensation”). 
 159 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1419 (2003) (holding that 
“the ‘just compensation’ required by the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property 
owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain”).  Clearly, public domain publishers 
experience a loss when copyright terms are extended for twenty years. 
 160 See Symposium, Panel II: Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 784 (2003). 
 161 See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation at 14, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
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Housing Authority v. Midkiff162 for the principle that “legislative 
alteration of such estates that destroys or limits the reversionary 
interest in real property in order to achieve redistribution between 
private parties is ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings 
Clause, and is constitutional if compensated.”163 
Although Moglen’s analysis demonstrates that a reversionary 
interest in real property may satisfy the Taking Clause’s “private 
property” requirement, and private redistribution can constitute 
“public use,” Moglen fails to demonstrate whether the Midkiff 
holding can be extended to personal property.  Moreover, he fails 
to establish that use of public domain works constitutes any sort of 
property.  Because it is not property, it is outside the scope of the 
Takings Clause.164 
The Supreme Court held in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.165 
that intellectual property rights constitute a “property right [that] is 
protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”166  In 
arriving at this conclusion, the Court observed that “‘[p]roperty 
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law.’”167  The Court held that “to the extent that Monsanto has an 
interest in its . . . data cognizable as a trade secret property right 
under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Takings 
Clause . . . .”168  Unlike the Missouri law referenced in Monsanto 
that treats trade secrets as property, there is no analogous law that 
defines the public’s interest in public domain works as a property 
 
 162 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 163 See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation at 14; see also Midkiff, 
467 U.S. at 241 (explaining that “public use” is satisfied if the taking is “rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose”). 
 164 See supra note 158. 
 165 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 469 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (trade secrets). 
 166 In addition, the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the Takings Clause protects 
an interest in a copyright. See Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983); Practice 
Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 167 Monsanto, 469 U.S. 986, 1001 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
577 (1972))). 
 168 Id. at 1003–04 (emphasis added). 
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right.  It may be a right, but it is not a property right.  Therefore, 
takings law is inapplicable. 
Moglen’s takings analysis suffers from an additional flaw.  He 
neglects to analyze whether the public domain publishers’ interests 
were harmed enough to invoke the Takings Clause.  Even though 
the CTEA will be very costly for those wishing to use works that 
but for the extension would have been in the public domain,169 in 
an additional twenty years the works will ultimately be exploitable 
by public domain publishers.  Under the sliding scale170 used by 
the Court, it would seem unlikely that enough value has been 
removed by the twenty-year extension for there to be a taking.171  
Even if the petitioners’ interest was characterized alternatively as a 
complete loss of business opportunity for a temporary period,172 
the CTEA still would not result in a taking because while certain 
works remain protected, there would still be a large body of usable 
works in the public domain.173 
 
 169 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 
01-618) (estimating that costs of the CTEA will be $317,000,000 annually for royalties, 
in addition to the costs of denied access to the vast majority of works that are not 
commercially valuable). 
 170 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 
(1987) (explaining that “our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value 
that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property . . .”); 
Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating that “the extent of the 
diminution . . . [w]hen it reaches a certain magnitude” warrants compensation). 
 171 See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) 
(citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), for the proposition that a “75% 
diminution in value caused by zoning law” did not qualify as a taking, and Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), for the ruling that an 87 1/2 % diminution in value did 
not qualify either) (Note that these high percentages are for regulatory takings, not 
physical occupation. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 434-35 (1982) (holding that any permanent physical occupation is a taking)).  Penn 
Central was a landmark takings case, introducing the following as the test factors for 
takings: “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[,] . . . the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[, 
and] . . . the character of the governmental action.” Id. 
 172 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1418–19 (2003) (stating that 
“compensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken . . . even though that use is 
temporary” and applying this reasoning to subverted interest payments). 
 173 The argument that nearly all works that would have been in the public domain 
without the CTEA have been taken for 20 years ignores the vast majority of works still 
exploitable by public domain publishers.  This argument is invalid because it is overly 
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2. Additional Considerations on the Takings Issue Provided 
by the Eldred Decision 
The above analysis of takings law reveals that a court could not 
find that a twenty-year term extension applied to works already 
created constitutes a taking.174  That plaintiffs’ interests do not 
constitute private property is fatal.175  Two additional 
considerations should also dissuade a court from concluding that a 
remedy is owed to public domain publishers: (1) The Eldred Court 
understood that the CTEA would injure public domain publishers 
and it upheld the statute nonetheless; (2) There is reason to believe 
that the Supreme Court implicitly decided the takings issue in 
Eldred. 
First, the Supreme Court in Eldred was aware of the harm that 
the CTEA would impose on public domain publishers, and this did 
not prevent it from upholding the constitutionality of the CTEA.  
Justice Stevens was outspoken about the fairness implications of 
the CTEA.  According to Stevens, “The fairness considerations 
that underlie the constitutional protections against ex post facto 
laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts would 
presumably disable Congress from making such a retroactive 
change in the public’s bargain with an inventor without providing 
compensation for the taking.”176  Nevertheless, the Court upheld 
the CTEA. 
Second, some legal scholars postulate that the Supreme Court 
implicitly decided the takings issue.  They suggest that Eldred did 
not circumvent takings issues, but instead elucidated the Supreme 
Court’s opinion on the issue.  According to Professor Richard A. 
Epstein, “[T]oday all efforts to stop government giveaways on 
constitutional grounds seem to have come to a dead-end after the 
Supreme Court used in essence a rational basis test to sustain a 
grand legislative giveaway under the [CTEA].”177  Similarly, 
 
narrow—it would be similar to arguing that if a zoning law prohibits use of 5% of your 
land, the government is taking 100% of 5% of your property. 
 174 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 177 See Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A Presumptive Vote for the 
Reliance Interest, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 79–80 (2003). 
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Professor Eric R. Claeys observed that the Supreme Court was not 
dissuaded from upholding the CTEA, despite the “serious takings 
questions” it raised.178  Such inferences with regard to the Supreme 
Court opinion may be persuasive to lower courts. 
B. A Claim Based upon a Theory for Reliance Damages 
1. Background: The Economics of Adjustments to the Law 
Professor Richard A. Epstein has argued that when the 
legislature contemplates a new law, it should be guided by a 
“strong presumption” to “keep the legal framework constant.”179  
This avoids unnecessarily interfering with the expectations of 
private parties.180  It also protects against the substantial costs due 
to the “time, expense, and uncertainty created by the development 
and implementation of new legal rules.”181  Nevertheless, the high 
costs an alteration to the law imposes upon the expectations of 
private parties may be justifiable, particularly when marginal 
benefits exceed marginal costs.182 
2. Compensation for the Residual Risks of Change 
The CTEA is a boon for copyright holders at the expense of 
public domain publishers.  Even if the CTEA is efficient, at 
minimum, “justice and efficiency” dictate that the “residual risks 
 
 178 Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1549, 1650 (2003) (suggesting that the Supreme Court was not dissuaded from 
upholding the CTEA as a result of the “serious takings questions” it raised). 
 179 Epstein, supra note 177, at 70. 
 180 Id. (“Private parties are thought to be better able to adapt to changes in the legal 
order than governments are to anticipate the behavior of private parties.  Therefore, the 
risk of legal change is placed not on the parties who initiate the change but on those 
whose expertise is said to allow them to anticipate any changes that might be made.”). 
 181 Id. at 72. 
 182 Id. at 71.  In other words, it is insufficient to find merely that the benefits of a new 
law outweigh its costs; this could have been the case with the previous law as well.  For 
example, consider copyright systems with terms of life plus 50 years and life plus 70 
years; both are more beneficial than no copyright protection at all.  Instead, it is necessary 
to determine whether the marginal benefits of changing the law exceed the marginal 
costs.  If this condition is met, then the differential between total costs and benefits will 
be greater for the new law than the previous law, and enacting the new law will be 
economically sound. 
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of change . . . ought to be borne in the first instance by those who 
champion or initiate the change, and not those who are asked to 
respond to it.”183  The winners (copyright holders) should be 
obligated to compensate the losers (public domain publishers) for 
the initial costs involved with adapting to the CTEA, and the actual 
losses incurred in reliance upon pre-CTEA copyright terms.184 
3. Compensation for Lost Profits 
a) The “Virtuous Government” vs. the Self-Interested 
Government 
Whether public domain publishers should be compensated for 
lost profits depends upon how legislators are characterized.  In 
Epstein’s “virtuous government,” legislators enact new laws only 
if they are either Pareto185 efficient or Kaldor-Hicks186 efficient,187 
and they are equally concerned about each individual’s welfare.188  
If this characterizes the government that enacted the CTEA, then 
there is no need to compensate public domain publishers for lost 
profits caused by the CTEA.189 
 
 183 Id. at 72. 
 184 This stage of the argument does not yet contemplate compensation for lost profits.  
Rather, it advocates reimbursement of costs such as those expended on preparing to 
release new books or digitally improving a sound recording, neither of which can be 
released. 
 185 In a Pareto efficient change, some parties are made better off, but none are made 
worse off.  E.g. Assuming only two individuals, A and B, a change is Pareto efficient if A 
benefits from the change, and B’s welfare stays the same, or also improves. 
 186 A change is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the gains exceed the losses.  E.g. Assuming 
only two individuals, A and B, a change is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if A’s benefit is greater 
than B’s loss. 
 187 Changes that are Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient meet the requirement that marginal 
benefits exceed marginal costs, as set forth in Part II.A.2.a, supra. 
 188 See Epstein, supra note 177, at 73 (“[T]he virtuous government does not target 
insular and isolated minorities, but rather treats the welfare of all its citizens equally.”). 
 189 See id. (With the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks tests, “[t]he distributional consequences 
might be unpleasant in any individual case, but even that unhappiness would tend to even 
itself out over the long-haul; the virtuous government does not target insular and isolated 
minorities, but rather treats the welfare of all its citizens equally.  In doing so, the 
constant procession of sound overall legal innovations will leave, after the dust settles, 
few if any losers behind.”). 
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However, this could not realistically represent any government.  
The best an optimist could hope for would be a situation that 
Epstein neglects to discuss—the “virtuous but fallible 
government.”  This model acknowledges that even a “virtuous” 
legislature would, either though lack of facts,190 negligence, or 
simple mistake, commonly but inadvertently enact laws that meet 
neither of the efficiency tests—even though it seeks to enact only 
efficient laws and to distribute benefits equally.  If the public 
domain publishers could prove that the CTEA is neither Pareto nor 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, then compensation would be justified 
under the “virtuous but fallible government” model.191 
In contrast to the two “virtuous” governments is one in which 
self-interest192 drives legislators to enact laws that are neither 
Pareto nor Kaldor-Hicks efficient.193  When this occurs, the 
“losers” of a change in law have a justifiable claim for relief, just 
as with a “virtuous but fallible government.”  However, with a 
 
 190 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and 
Policy?, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 14 (2003–2004) (“Economic input should . . . be 
sought when copyright laws are amended.  Had the US Congress, for example, sought 
impartial advice from economists about the effects of copyright term extension before 
enacting the CTEA, it is conceivable that economic arguments against it would have 
persuaded some in Congress to oppose it.”). 
 191 The only exception would be if mistakes were evenly distributed by amount, or so 
close that the administrative costs of remedying the inequalities would outweigh the 
benefits to be distributed.  However, this is unlikely.  In the realm of copyright, for 
example: 
[m]ajor copyright firms are well-organized and well-funded.  They typically 
have a common interest in getting stronger legal rules from the legislature.  
Hence, it may be a sound investment for them to lobby to achieve the 
concentrated benefit a legislature can grant them. . . .  [In contrast,] [c]ollective 
action problems make it difficult for parties that will be negatively affected by 
higher protection rules to organize effective resistance to copyright industry 
lobbying.  This mix of concentrated benefits and distributed costs is likely to 
yield the best laws money can buy.  The Copyright Term Extension Act . . . [is 
a] widely recognized example[] . . . . 
Id. at 9–10. 
 192 Epstein’s definition of self-interest is not entirely clear.  He elucidates what he means 
by self-interest when states that “[s]elf interest is a strong driver of individual behavior 
outside of political institutions, and people do not check their personal passions and 
inclinations at the door when they assume public office.” See Epstein, supra note 177, at 
73–74.  He later refers to “unpredictable changes bought by lobbying interests groups.” 
Id. at 76. 
 193 Id. at 73–74. 
STRATTON 5/25/2005  4:09 PM 
2005] CHALLENGING THE CTEA, POST-ELDRED 929 
self-interested legislature, the “losers” also deserve relief even if 
the law is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because the self-interested 
government will not strive to distribute benefits equally over 
time—instead it will reward the same benefactors over and over 
again.  This important difference in distribution, in addition to the 
self-interested government’s predisposition to intentionally (as 
opposed to merely negligently) adopt inefficient laws, guarantees 
that the magnitude of the inequities will be significantly greater 
with the self-interested legislature than the “virtuous but fallible 
government.”  As Epstein explains, this situation is particularly 
harmful because private parties are compelled: 
to bear the risk of changes that are [intentionally] socially 
destructive, and to organize their operations and 
investments in ways that resist the silliness of government 
initiatives and programs.  This anticipation is all the more 
difficult when individuals have to foresee not only [what in 
good-faith are expected to be] beneficial changes, but also 
unpredictable changes bought by lobbying interest groups.  
Compensation for losses induced by legal changes is one 
possible alternative, which is however, very difficult to 
implement with respect to general changes in the legal rule.  
Another alternative is a limited form of grandfathering to 
protect the reliance interests of those who acted under the 
previous regime.  Still a third possibility is [judicial 
intervention] to strike down the changes to begin 
with . . . .194 
If a court were to conclude that the CTEA is neither Pareto nor 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or under the self-interested model, merely 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, Epstein’s reliance interest analysis would 
provide an economic theory for giving public domain publishers 
one of these remedies. 
b) Is the CTEA Efficient? 
Public domain publishers would merit compensation for lost 
profits if they could prove that the CTEA is neither Pareto nor 
 
 194 Id. at 76.  These remedies are also applicable to the inefficient changes made by a 
“virtuous but fallible” government. 
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Kaldor-Hicks efficient.  Because the CTEA harms public domain 
publishers, the CTEA is not Pareto efficient; therefore, it is only 
necessary to determine whether it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.  Do 
the benefits to the copyright holders, businesses that work with 
copyright industries, and the U.S. government outweigh the costs 
to the rest of society, particularly consumers, public domain 
publishers, and potential derivative users? 
i. Benefits 
As noted by Congress, the copyright industries are a lucrative 
source of income from foreign countries and are responsible for 
more than 5% of the U.S. workforce.195  Although copyright term 
extension means that U.S. consumers have to pay higher prices, a 
substantial benefit accrues to Americans generally because term 
extension is very favorable to the U.S.’s export market.  In 
addition, the extra income earned by the copyright industries 
domestically and from foreigners might provide a significant 
source of tax revenue for the U.S. Government.196 
Greater income for copyright industries also leads to the 
subsidization of more works.197  A common criticism of the CTEA 
is that it provides no additional incentives to create when applied 
to works already created.198  However, this ignores the reality that 
often the copyright is not held by the creator, but by a large 
business in the copyright industry that can use the additional 
profits to subsidize more works.199 
The film industry provides a useful example.  The existence of 
the specialty divisions of major studios, such as Sony Pictures 
Classics, Paramount Classics, Warner Independent, Focus 
Features, and Fox Searchlight, depend upon the financing of the 
 
 195 See supra note 32; see also Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case for Copyright 
Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 294 (2002) (“At the time of the CTEA’s passage, 
the copyright industries accounted for almost six percent of the U.S. gross domestic 
product.  All together, the industries represented the nation’s largest or second largest 
group of exporters.  The CTEA’s retrospective portion is worth a great deal of money to 
the copyright holders.”). 
 196 Conversation with Professor Hugh C. Hansen, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 
2005). 
 197 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 12–13 (1996). 
 198 See supra text accompanying notes 65–66. 
 199 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 12–13 (1996); supra note 35. 
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major studios.200  Films in these divisions “chase after relatively 
small returns,” despite, in recent years, receiving much critical 
acclaim.201  As opposed to profitability, they exist, in part, to 
satisfy “the desire of actors and directors to pursue challenging and 
artistically satisfying work.”202  As stated by Tom Bernard, co-
president of Sony Pictures Classics, “‘We’ve found pockets within 
these large companies where there is an interest in this kind of 
freedom and creativity.’”203  Greater profits for the major studios 
should ensure that these valuable artistic ventures continue to be 
funded. 
There are some more subtle benefits to copyright term 
extension as well.  William Landes and Richard Posner have 
observed that “the need to invest in intellectual property to 
maximize its value is not exhausted in the initial creation of the 
property.  Investment is necessary to maintain the value of the 
property as well, and also to resurrect abandoned or otherwise 
unexploited intellectual property.”204  This investment will often 
not occur in the absence of copyright protection.205  Two examples 
involve the “tragedy of the commons” and incentive to undertake 
risks. 
Term extension avoids the “tragedy of the commons.”206  “[I]n 
the absence of property rights, [a] pasture would be overgrazed 
because none of the users would take account of the cost that his 
use imposed on the other users by making their cattle graze more 
to obtain the same amount of food.”207  In other words, the value of 
a public good such as intellectual property could be reduced by 
consumption beyond the efficient level.208  If, hypothetically, 
advertisers could freely use the image of Humphrey Bogart, it is 
 
 200 A.O. Scott, The Invasion of the Midsize Movie, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at E1. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 471, 491 (2003). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 484–89. 
 207 Id. at 484. 
 208 “Overgrazing” problems are recognized in trademark law and increasingly in the law 
of publicity rights. See id. at 485. 
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possible that the image could become worthless through over-
exposure, confusion, or tarnishment.209  An example in copyright 
involves the Walt Disney Company, which exerts care to protect 
the appeal and marketability of its copyrighted characters by not 
over-exposing them.210  Copyright term extension may increase the 
social value211 of these characters. 
Property rights—through term extension—can also increase the 
amount of works on the market in another way.  In the absence of 
property rights, even public domain publishers will hesitate to 
publish all but the most popular public domain books.212  If a 
publisher expects that one out of five obscure public domain books 
it releases will be commercially successful, and other publishers 
can free ride on the risk-taking by just releasing the one successful 
book, then the risk-taking publisher will not be able to recoup the 
expenses of releasing all five books.213  The absence of property 
rights may actually inhibit the publication of books. 
Other benefits to the CTEA, as evidenced by the legislative 
history, include harmonization with Europe, protection covering 
the author and two succeeding generations, and incentive to restore 
or digitize works.214 
 
 
 209 Id. at 486. 
 210 Id.  Landes and Posner also name the works of Shakespeare as a counterexample. See 
id. at 488.  Epstein would likely view this counterexample as the rule, not the exception: 
There are countless, often perverse, versions of Shakespeare that are produced 
everywhere today.  The Shakespeare trust would probably not license some of 
these performances at all.  Further, the trust would charge a hefty fee for the 
standard performances that they did license, and could easily place tight 
restrictions on the choice of sets, designs, actors and the like.  Anyone is hard 
pressed to believe that Shakespeare’s star has been dimmed by the calamities 
committed in his name, or that the world would be a better place if the obvious 
restrictions on use could be achieved with the blessing of the state. 
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property?  Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright 
Law 35 (Apr. 2004) (Working Paper No. 204), available at http://www.law.uchicago-
.edu/Lawecon/index.html. 
 211 The social value equals the sum of the value to producers and the value to 
consumers. 
 212 Landes & Posner, supra note 204, at 488–89. 
 213 Id. at 489. 
 214 See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. 
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ii. Costs 
The costs to consumers of public domain materials do not 
always vary significantly from the prices of copyright protected 
material.  “The legal monopoly conferred by a copyright . . . need 
not translate itself into an economic monopoly so long as there are 
close substitutes, as there are for every new popular song that is 
released.”215  Moreover, for works other than those posted in 
digital form on the Internet, many will entail similar costs in 
bringing them to the market, regardless of copyright protection.  
Books will still have to be printed, delivered, and sold through 
retail chains, at a profit to the publisher.216  Theatrical productions 
will still require the costs of actors, venue, advertising, technical 
crew, set design, costumes, make-up, etc. 
There is also “deadweight loss” involved—the loss resulting 
from the consumers who would consume at the public domain 
publisher’s price, but not at the copyright–protected price217—but 
“because the scope of copyright protection is . . . very narrow, the 
size of the deadweight loss is likely to be relatively small.  The 
narrower the scope of a property right, the more good substitutes 
there are, the less the owner’s monopoly power is, therefore, and 
so the smaller is the deadweight loss that the monopoly creates.”218 
The distinction between whether the creation is in the public 
domain or not is more critical for creators who want to make 
derivative works.  Copyright protection increases the costs for the 
derivative creator because he or she must undertake the 
expenditures of tracking down the copyright holder and negotiating 
a license.219  However, the plight of the derivative user should not 
be too distressing.  Even with the CTEA, the idea/expression 
dichotomy, scenes à faire, and fair use doctrine provide much for a 
creator to draw from, apart from the works that are already in the 
public domain.  “The lost use involved is of little consequence for 
any dynamic development of the arts, which need not be the case 
 
 215 Epstein, supra note 210, at 30–31. 
 216 The sale of books would be analogous to the sale of sound recordings or films. 
 217 Landes & Posner, supra note 204, at 480–81. 
 218 Id. at 481. 
 219 See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
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in patents.”220  As for the tracking costs, though they are increased 
by the CTEA,221 the CTEA is not the real culprit.  Registration is 
the remedy; term lengths do not need to be reduced.222 
iii. Result 
Although Lessig has concluded that “[a]ny wealth [the CTEA] 
creates for copyright holders is swamped by the wealth the public 
loses in lower costs and wider access,”223 this statement masks the 
complexity of interests at stake.  Lessig considers neither the 
benefits that the CTEA provides the public as consumer,224 nor the 
benefits for other beneficiaries, such as the U.S. Government and 
the American worker.225  To determine whether the CTEA is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, further economic analyses on the 
magnitude of the above-mentioned costs and benefits would be 
required.  Nevertheless, this Note opines that the CTEA is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient, particularly because the net harm to the public is 
likely to be small given that the losses are circumscribed by 
copyright’s incomplete monopoly power and the availability of 
substitutes, and the benefits are not inconsequential: increased 
exports, taxes, jobs, and subsidization of new works. 
c) Should There Be a Different Outcome if the Legislature 
Is Self-Interested? 
Under the self-interested government model, a remedy for 
public domain publishers is justifiable even if the CTEA meets the 
 
 220 Epstein, supra note 210, at 31.  “No one has to use any particular song or story for a 
particular project, but can draw on a rich culture, including items that have fallen out of 
copyright protection.  In contrast, it is quite difficult to conduct research on breast cancer 
unless one has access to the BRAC-I gene.” Id. 
 221 See supra note 88. 
 222 Advocating indefinitely renewable copyright, Landes and Posner observe: “It is not 
perpetual property rights but the absence of registration that creates prohibitive tracing 
costs.” Landes & Posner, supra note 204, at 477. 
 223 Lawrence Lessig, They’re Not Worthy: Why Extend the Copyright on Works that No 
Longer Have Commercial Value?, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.01/view.-
html?pg=5 (Jan. 2005). 
 224 See supra notes 197–203 (subsidization of new works), 206–11 (avoiding the 
“tragedy of the commons”), and 212–13 (increasing the release of works already created), 
and accompanying text. 
 225 See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (discussing jobs, taxes, and trade 
balance). 
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Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test, because the government there does 
not seek to distribute benefits equally in the long run.226  Lessig, 
citing political contributions, argues that legislative self-interest 
influenced the passage of the CTEA,227 but his concept of self-
interest is too expansive, encompassing activities fully consistent 
with the First Amendment right to petition.228  Whether Epstein’s 
definition of self-interest includes Lessig’s “self-interest” is 
unclear,229 but irrelevant—no court would be persuaded that there 
should be a remedy for the “losers” in a change in law just because 
lobbying exists.  Were a court to decide otherwise, every legislator 
would be deemed self-interested, and the ability to create new laws 
would be crippled by the need to provide remedies for all the 
“losers.”230  This is unworkable.  As a result, the self-interested 
 
 226 See supra Part II.A.1.c.i. 
 227 See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 216–18 (“[Extending copyright terms] is lucrative for 
Congress.  Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of 
money to see their copyright terms extended. . . . [T]his is the core of the corruption in 
our present system of government.  ‘Corruption’ not in the sense that representatives are 
bribed.  Rather, ‘corruption’ in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries of 
Congress’s acts to raise and give money to Congress to induct it to act. . . . In the 
lobbying that led to the passage of the [CTEA], this ‘theory’ about incentives was proved 
real.  Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the [CTEA] in the House received the 
maximum contribution from Disney’s political action committee; in the Senate, eight of 
the twelve sponsors received contributions.  The RIAA and MPAA are estimated to have 
spent over $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle.  They paid out more than 
$200,000 in campaign contributions.  Disney is estimated to have contributed more than 
$800,000 to reelection campaigns in the 1998 cycle.”). 
 228 Notably Lessig does not allege that any illegal activity took place. See id. 
 229 See supra note 192. 
 230 See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright 
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 
2331, 2407 (2003) (“[The Lessig] view would be that, because of the economic power of 
certain corporations and because of the importance they attached to the CTEA, a 
congressional majority adopted a statute not in the majority’s interest and that the Court 
should therefore closely scrutinize the resulting legislation.  This is a formula that, if 
generally applied would give courts a roving commission to overturn legislation that they 
deem not in the public interest.  One does not have to be a cynic (or a public choice 
theorist) to recognize that powerful economic interest account for a great deal of 
legislation.  The amount of congressional legislation and the amount of legislation 
adopted by states that could be analogized to [Lessig’s] approach to the CTEA is 
astonishing.  If courts aggressively review economic legislation that seems to favor 
powerful special interest, they must aggressively review much—and perhaps most—
economic legislation.”). 
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government model should not create any remedies not available 
under the “virtuous but fallible government” model. 
d) Does Any Law Support these Results?  Would Such 
Laws Be Advisable? 
Even if it could be proven that the CTEA is not Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient, there is presently no law supporting remedies for 
inefficient changes in laws.  This is not surprising: exacting 
scrutiny would severely inhibit lawmaking and create substantial 
uncertainty over passed laws.231  In addition, providing remedies, 
such as compensation, grandfathering, or striking down the 
changes, may be prohibitively complicated.232 
With economic legislation in particular, there are important 
reasons to defer to Congress.  The first is that courts are not well-
equipped to evaluate this type of legislation.233  “Courts are poorly 
positioned to gather and assess the data needed to evaluate 
economic decisions, and . . . if the Court guesses wrong about the 
consequences, the very nature of constitutional adjudication makes 
it difficult to shift course.”234  The second is that our government 
relies upon majority decision-making for its legitimacy.235  This 
process should only be interrupted if there is a flaw, the most 
common example being when discrete and insular minorities are 
targeted.236  Stricter scrutiny is justified here because these 
individuals do not have adequate representation.237  In contrast, 
“economic legislation is the paradigmatic example of the type of 
legislation that courts should not scrutinize closely.  Economic 
legislation is the product of trade-offs made by interest groups.  
Except in exceptional circumstances, courts should not upset the 
resulting bargained-for deals.”238 
 
 231 Id. 
 232 See Epstein, supra note 177, at 76; supra text accompanying note 194. 
 233 See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 230, at 2407. 
 234 Id. 
 235 See id. at 2401 (crediting John Hart Ely for the political process rationale for judicial 
deference discussed here). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
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As a result, even if economic theory justifies a remedy for the 
plaintiffs (which it likely does not), such a finding should not 
advance the plaintiff’s case—not only does there not exist any 
cause of action embracing such a theory, but the importance of 
deferring to Congress on economic legislation recommends that a 
finding of economic inefficiency should not be persuasive even as 
a policy argument. 
III. SECOND CLAIM: THE CTEA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
BECAUSE THE ABSENCE OF RENEWAL PROVISIONS RESULTS IN 
WORKS BEING LOCKED-UP, REGARDLESS OF THE PREFERENCES OF 
THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER 
A. Does the CTEA Tie the Hands of the Copyright Holder? 
Forget Mickey Mouse.  Forget Robert Frost.  Forget all the 
works from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing 
commercial value.  The real harm of term extension comes 
not from these famous works.  The real harm is to the 
works that are not famous, not commercially exploited, and 
no longer available as a result.239 
This harm that Lessig speaks of could be ameliorated if the 
copyright holder was able to release his work into the public 
domain at his own will, or broadly advertise that certain uses will 
be permitted for free.  However, contrary to Lessig’s claim, the 
absence of renewal provisions does not entirely foreclose these 
options from the copyright holder.  Specifically, a copyright holder 
can choose to abandon his work if he wants it to enter the public 
domain, or license certain (or all) uses of his work, for free.  
Lessig’s own Creative Commons substantially facilitates both of 
these processes. 
Should a copyright holder decide to abandon his copyright, he 
must engage in “an overt act evidencing such an intent.”240  
 
 239 See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 221–27. 
 240 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 13.06 (2003) (stating that there is “strong 
authority holding than an overt act evidencing such an intent is necessary to establish 
abandonment”). 
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Although the caselaw in this area is not particularly well-
developed, authors have been held to establish an intent to abandon 
by implying that their work was in the public domain when others 
requested to use it,241 and by widely distributing their work without 
a copyright notice and not policing infringement.242  In addition, 
the Copyright Office will aid a copyright owner in effecting 
abandonment by recording an affidavit expressing the copyright 
holder’s desire to abandon the copyright, and requesting return of 
the Certification of Registration.243 
Of course, even without abandonment, a copyright holder 
could retain his copyright and decide to license his work for free to 
individuals and organizations of his choice, for certain uses of his 
choice.  This process is made even simpler with the Creative 
Commons244 because the Creative Commons provides a variety of 
simple licenses for the creator to choose from,245 and it also 
provides a central location for content users to see what works and 
uses are available.246  This cuts down significantly on the 
transaction costs of the content provider and the content seeker.  
The process of choosing a license is fairly easy; the copyright 
owner merely answers a few questions, such as what uses are 
permitted, whether attribution is required, and whether 
modifications are permitted.247  The process is intentionally simple, 
so that the copyright owner can do it himself, without the 
assistance of a lawyer.248  And if the copyright holder wants to go 
 
 241 Id. § 13.06 & n.12.1 (citing Sanga Music, Inc. v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 55 
F.3d 756 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 242 Id. § 13.06 & n.15 (citing Stuff v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 342 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
 243 See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices ch. 1603.02 
(1998) (“Any other document, including . . . an abandonment of copyright . . . will be 
recorded in the Copyright Office . . . .”), at http://www.copyright.gov/compendium-
/1600.htm; BERNARD C. DIETZ, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION PRAC. § 24:27 (2003) 
(describing the assistance of the Copyright Office in effecting abandonment). 
 244 For a discussion of the Creative Commons, see LESSIG, supra note 5, at 282–86. 
 245 See Choose License, at http://creativecommons.org/license (last visited Mar. 27, 
2005) (offering a choice of licenses for authors). 
 246 See Get Content, at http://creativecommons.org/getcontent (last visited Mar. 27, 
2005) (providing a search engine and directories of works protected by Creative 
Commons licenses). 
 247 See Choose License, at http://creativecommons.org/license (last visited Mar. 27, 
2005). 
 248 See generally LESSIG, supra note 5, at 282–86. 
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so far as to relinquish all rights, and dedicate it to the public 
domain, he may accomplish that as well with the Creative 
Commons, by selecting “Public Domain Dedication.”249 
As for works that authors do not want to license for free, i.e. 
those with enduring commercial value, there could still be the 
problem of these works being locked-up if the copyright holder 
cannot be located.  This is a problem that exists under any 
copyright regime and is probably exacerbated by extended 
terms.250  Nevertheless, it is not true that such works are locked-up 
regardless of the preferences of copyright holders, because a 
proactive copyright holder who wishes to remain accessible can 
take actions such as registering his copyright,251 updating such 
registration,252 placing notice of copyright on copies of his work,253 
and recording transfers.254 
B. Other Reasons Why the Claim Should Fail 
As demonstrated in the section above, the facts do not support 
Lessig’s claim that works are locked-up regardless of the 
preferences of copyright holders.  Although the various methods 
available for relinquishing full copyright protection and increasing 
accessibility to potential licensees should be sufficient to defeat 
Lessig’s claim, there are other reasons why it is likely to fail: the 
existence of the CTEA infringement exception, the pending 
 
 249 See Public Domain Dedication, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2005). 
 250 See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 251 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o some extent 
[permission costs] accompany any copyright law, regardless of the length of the 
copyright term.  But to extend that term . . . will dramatically increase the size of the 
costs . . . .”). 
 251 See 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2004) (copyright registration generally); 17 U.S.C. § 409 
(2004) (application procedures). 
 252 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(d) (2004) (enabling the Register to permit a copyright holder to 
“correct an error in a copyright registration or to amplify the information given in a 
registration”). 
 253 See 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2004) (permitting “a notice of copyright as provided by this 
section [to] be placed on publicly distributed copies”). 
 254 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2004) (“Any transfer of copyright ownership or other 
document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the 
document filed for recordation bears the actual signature of the person who executed it, 
or if it is accompanied by a sworn or official certification that it is a true copy of the 
original, signed document.”). 
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“Public Domain Enhancement Act,” and the minimal amount of 
harm at stake. 
1. The CTEA’s Infringement Exception 
The CTEA itself has an infringement exception that permits 
libraries and archives to “reproduce, distribute, display, or 
perform” certain works during the last twenty years of copyright 
protection, “for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research” 
if after “reasonable investigation” it is found that they are neither 
“subject to normal commercial exploitation” nor attainable at a 
reasonable price.255  This provision directly addresses Lessig’s 
concern over the orphan works problem, i.e. that unprofitable 
works will become unavailable during the copyright period.256  
Notably, Lessig was silent about the “library exception” in the 
Kahle complaint, even though it goes to the heart of the policy 
problems he is concerned about.257  He certainly could have at least 
argued that it would be inconsequential, as Justice Breyer did in his 
Eldred dissent, claiming that the uncertain bounds of the “library 
exception” would render it useless.258  Perhaps Lessig would have 
been wiser to put his efforts into litigating cases that would clarify 
the exception (and possibly generate favorable judge-made law) 
instead of litigating the flaccid Golan and Kahle. 
2. The Public Domain Enhancement Act 
The pending “Public Domain Enhancement Act”259 could 
strike the balance Lessig desires without invalidating the CTEA.260  
 
 255 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2004); supra note 59 (explaining the statute and Congress’s 
rationale). 
 256 See supra note 239 and accompanying text (quote by Lessig that he is primarily 
concerned about unprofitable works). But see supra note 90 (argument by Justice Breyer 
that the coverage of the infringement exception is too limited and its “reasonable 
investigation” requirement is too vague). 
 257 See generally Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Kahle v. Ashcroft (C 
04-1127 BZ), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ash-
croft.shtml. 
 258 See supra note 90. 
 259 Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 260 On the website for the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society (of 
which Lessig is the founder), it is noted that if the PDEA were passed, Kahle might not 
be necessary.  Yet it is also observed that the PDEA has not received much favor in 
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The act, if passed, would reinstate copyright renewal.261  Copyright 
holders would lose their copyright after fifty years of protection 
unless they pay $1.262  Thereafter, the copyright holder would have 
to renew every ten years.263  Copyright owners of valuable 
copyrights (in addition to any other diligent and determined 
copyright holder) would be able to enjoy the entire period of 
copyright protection under the CTEA.  Those who have only a 
minimal economic interest in their copyright, and are unmotivated 
to either renew or affirmatively abandon,264 will have their works 
enter the public domain. 
The “Public Domain Enhancement Act” would allow Congress 
to remedy some of the CTEA’s undesirable effects without 
jeopardizing the entire CTEA.  Given the level of deference paid to 
Congress in Eldred265 and the Supreme Court’s holding in favor of 
the CTEA, a court would probably be disinclined to overturn the 
entire CTEA for a limited adverse effect266 (which arguably does 
not exist).267  Instead, it would likely be persuaded to allow 
Congress to address the issue, if it wishes to. 
3. The Amount of Harm at Stake Is Minimal 
The ultimate harm to the public is likely to be minor if “locked-
up” works do not reach the public domain until the end of the 
copyright term.  One reason is that the works, if not profitable to 
 
Congress thus far. See Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, Kahle v. 
Ashcroft Case Page, at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2005). 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. On top of the fifty years, there would be a six month grace period in which the 
copyright holder could pay the $1 fee without incurring copyright expiration. Id. 
 263 Id. A six month grace period exists if payment is not made by the end of ten years. 
Id. 
 264 See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 137, 161 n.107 (1993) (suggesting that a copyright holder would lack the 
motivation to record an abandonment of copyright). 
 265 Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (“[W]e find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are 
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this 
order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). 
 266 This is specifically referring to the argument that works are locked-up regardless of 
the preferences of copyright holders. 
 267 See supra Part III.A. 
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publish (especially with the declining costs and the increasing 
possibilities made available by computers and the internet), are 
likely to be quite esoteric.268  Another reason is that if anyone has 
an interest in the work, it will probably not be lost.269  Fans will 
publish copyrighted works on the internet regardless of legality.270  
The third reason addresses concerns over derivative uses, and 
suggests that cultural advancement will not be unduly slowed 
down if users cannot appropriate works before the full copyright 
period runs out.  The “critics [of control, e.g. Lessig] understate—
perhaps dramatically—the contribution that even ‘perfect’ control 
of intellectual creations makes to the public domain.”271  To 
construe the public domain merely as unprotected works 
unnecessarily trivializes the manifestly important effects of 
protected works on culture.272  Consider, for instance, a novel by 
Hemingway or Faulkner.  Aside from the cultural enrichment and 
pleasure that the general reader can get from such a novel, a writer 
learns priceless lessons about writing style.  These contributions to 
the public domain are immensely more valuable than what one can 
accomplish by copying verbatim large sections of the original 
work.  Likewise, any fan of music knows how much musicians 
love to talk about their influences.  Musicians learn a lot merely 
from listening to protected recordings of other musicians and 
legally can apply elements of style to their own music.  In general, 
there is a lot to “borrow” that is non-infringing. 
In sum, not only does Lessig’s argument fail on the facts—
because copyright holders can choose to release their works into 
the public domain, and take measures to increase accessibility to 
 
 268 For a list of orphan works submitted by the public to help the Kahle plaintiffs, see 
Kahle v. Ashcroft Submission Site, at http://notabug.com/kahle (last visited Mar. 27, 
2005).  Note however that some of the works are clearly not orphaned, but rather 
unreleased due to the copyright holder’s preferences. 
 269 See Kevin Kelly, Making My Own Music, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at A21 
(explaining how fans have played an enormous role in digitizing music, books, and 
films). 
 270 Id.  They can also cheaply store them on their hard drives. 
 271 R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997 (2003). 
 272 Cf. id. at 1010 (“[E]ven fully ‘propertized’ intellectual goods will nonetheless 
contribute, perhaps significantly, to the growth of open information.”). 
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potential licensees—but there are also no other substantial 
justifications to incline a court to find otherwise. 
IV. THE SHADOW OF ELDRED 
This Note predicts that both claims—that the effect of the 
CTEA is unconstitutional because (i) the extended copyright terms 
are overly burdensome on those who publish public domain works 
and (ii) the absence of renewal provisions results in works being 
locked-up, regardless of the preferences of the copyright holders—
will fail.  Neither argument is persuasive, especially when 
analyzed against the backdrop of Eldred.  In Eldred, numerous 
arguments against the constitutionality of the CTEA were 
made273—but to no avail.  As one of Lessig’s opponents said, “In 
Eldred, they didn’t just focus on the limited times argument; they 
threw in everything and the kitchen sink.”274  With these 
arguments, the petitioners did not just lose.  They lost decisively.  
They lost at the District Court level,275 they lost in the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals,276 and finally, they lost in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.277  Moreover, seven of nine Supreme Court Justices voted 
against the petitioners.278  With rational basis scrutiny, as long as 
the low standard of rationality is met, it is immaterial whether 
petitioners’ arguments and policy considerations outweigh those of 
Congress.279  Given Lessig’s utter failure previously to persuade 
the Supreme Court that the CTEA is unconstitutional, any court 
subsequently looking at the effects of the CTEA likely will not be 
prone to side with Lessig.  His lack of success in Golan and Kahle 
confirm this.280 
 
 273 See supra Part I.C–D. 
 274 Krause, supra note 4, at 41 (quoting Fritz Attaway, Executive Vice President and 
Washington General Counsel of the Motion Picture Association of America). 
 275 Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting summary judgment for 
defendants); see supra note 39. 
 276 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see supra notes 40–41. 
 277 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003). 
 278 See id. 
 279 See id. at 208 (“[W]e find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty 
to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, 
however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). 
 280 See supra Parts I.E.2, I.F.3. 
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In what may be a mix of strategy and delusion,281 Lessig 
blames himself for losing Eldred and dissects his performance to 
see where he went wrong.282  Ultimately, however, his assertion 
that the case could and should have been won does not undermine 
the authority of Eldred.283  In trying to pinpoint errors that he 
made,284 he fails to see the bigger picture.  The Supreme Court 
addressed many arguments on the constitutionality of the CTEA 
and was presented with numerous briefs that addressed the policy 
ramifications of the CTEA.  Lessig did not lose because he made a 
few missteps during oral arguments. 
The Eldred decision casts a shadow; this Note posits that there 
will be a presumption against Lessig in arguments invoking the 
CTEA.  So far, this has been borne out in Golan and Kahle. 
CONCLUSION 
Even with the uncertainty of litigation, Lessig likely would lose 
on both of the claims analyzed in this Note.  The claim over the 
hardship faced by public domain publishers will not prevail 
because this loss was completely anticipated in Eldred and takings 
law requires an injury to property, which was absent here.  
Moreover, their losses are not compelling enough to justify a 
radical upgrade of takings law, especially upon a theory equating 
lobbying with self-interest and encouraging the Court to scrutinize 
economic legislation.  The claim that works will be locked-up, 
regardless of the preferences of copyright holders, also fails 
because it is factually incorrect with the existence of the Creative 
Commons, abandonment, registration, and the ability to record 
transfers. 
The foregoing does not mean that Lessig’s efforts in Eldred 
have not been valuable.  His battle against copyright term 
 
 281 It is strategic in the sense that if he wants to reargue the case, he has to claim that the 
case could have been won.  But he is also delusional if he ignores all of the arguments 
that he and his amici made and instead blames defeat on what he believes were a few 
sub-optimal answers that he made in oral argument. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 238–41. 
 282 See id. at 236–41. 
 283 Id. at 229. 
 284 Id. at 236–41. 
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extension has raised public awareness of important copyright 
issues.  As a result, it is now highly unlikely that Congress would 
attempt further increase copyright terms.  In addition, the Creative 
Commons and the Public Domain Enhancement Act (if passed) 
will help to replenish the public domain, therefore accomplishing, 
to an extent, Lessig’s goals. 
 
